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Abstract
We characterize the optimal investment decision and the stock value of an unlevered ￿rm that
holds the non-standard option of improving the growth rate of cash￿ ows from its assets in place upon
incurring an irreversible cost. The ￿rm￿ s investment policy and equity price are studied as a function
of the market price of risk, of cash￿ ow￿ s exposure to systematic risk, and of cash￿ ow volatility.
JEL classi￿cation: C6; E2
Keywords: Investment; Equity pricing; Market price of risk
1 Introduction
The analysis of the investment policy of an unlevered ￿rm and of the ￿rm￿ s ensuing value in the presence
of risk premia is known to be a delicate issue since the pioneering works of MacDonald and Siegel (1986),
Pindyck (1988), and Dixit (1989). The presence of economy-wide risk aversion signi￿cantly impacts the
￿rm￿ s investment decision and the ￿rm￿ s fair value. Chie￿ y, ignoring risk premia hampers the analysis as
the risk-adjusted drift of the ￿rm￿ s cash￿ ow process and its volatility remain unnaturally delinked. If the
market price of risk is positive, a surge in the systematic component of cash￿ ow volatility does in￿ ate the
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1value of the option-like components of ￿rm￿ s equity but has also a general de￿ ating e⁄ect on the value
of any claim on the ￿rm￿ s cash￿ ows.
In contrast, the link between equity valuation, optimal investment, and risk adjustment is the center
of our attention. We focus on a unlevered ￿rm that has the investment option of improving the expected
growth rate of cash￿ ows from its assets in place rather than the usual investment option of either scaling
them up or buying incremental assets. The investment policy and the stock value are investigated for
di⁄erent levels of the economy-wide risk aversion, of cash￿ ow￿ s correlation with systematic shocks, and
of cash￿ ow volatility.
The emphasis on systematic risk places our analysis close to the works of Sarkar (2000), Cappuccio
and Moretto (2001), Sarkar (2003), and Lund (2005). These works have a di⁄erent focus. They are mainly
concerned with ￿rm￿ s ￿ nearness￿to invest as assessed by the objective probability of investing within a
￿xed horizon and by measures of expected investment. Also, they study the ￿rm￿ s classical investment
option of acquiring incremental assets. Our explicit treatment of equity pricing for an unlevered ￿rm
that holds the non-standard option of improving the growth rate of its assets in place makes a distinct
contribution to their analyses.
Our work is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the primitives of our continuous-time model.
Equity valuation is carried out in Section 3. Section 4 gives numerical evidence on how risk premia shape
investment policy and equity value. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stochastic discount factor and equity risk premium
We assume the existence of an exogenous state-price density process f￿g that prices any traded asset in
the economy and its dynamics is
d￿
￿
= ￿rdt ￿ ￿dWP;
where r is the riskfree rate, ￿ is the market price of systematic risk, and P denotes the objective probability
measure.
The ￿rm￿ s cash￿ ow level has the following dynamics:
dD
D
= ￿dt + ￿dZP:
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where [￿;￿] denotes the quadratic covariation of two di⁄usive processes. The parameter ￿ represents the





becomes negative, where SD denotes the derivative of the stock price S with respect to the ￿rm￿ s cash￿ ow
level D.
As it is natural for cash￿ ows stemming from real business operations, we assume that the process
fDg cannot be seen as the value process of a self-￿nancing portfolio of traded assets. Hence, the expected
growth rate ￿ bears no a priori relation with r, ￿ and ￿ apart from the one established by a boundedness
condition on the ￿rm￿ s fair value s(D) in the absence of investment options:
0 ￿ s(D) =
D
r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
< 1 for bounded levels of D.
Such a condition is equivalent to the well-known expected-return-shortfall condition in the real options
literature:
r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ > 0:
The ￿rm is an all-equity corporation and is run by equityholders who maximize the value of equity.
The ￿rm has an investment opportunity to improve the growth rate of its activities from ￿ to ￿0 (r+￿￿￿ >
￿0 > ￿) upon incurring an irreversible cost I.
Since the ￿rm￿ s equity is a traded security that provides an intermediate payout equal to D per unit
time, the no-arbitrage dynamics of equity prices in the absence and in the presence of the investment



































At the investment date, equityholders contribute new equity funds for an amount I. These funds are
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2￿2￿2 + 2￿2r
￿2 > 1;








r+￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿ s(U) ￿ I
￿￿D
U
￿￿1 if 0 ￿ D ￿ U;
D




(r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿0)(r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿)
￿0 ￿ ￿
;




SDDD2￿2 + D = Sr + SDD￿￿￿
with the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:
S (U) =
U










r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿0:
Within this framework, an increase of the non-systematic component of cash￿ ow risk can be manifestly
understood as an increase in ￿ accompanied by a decrease in ￿. The accompanying decrease in the
exposure to systematic risk is such that the expected-return shortfalls r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ and r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿0
remain untouched at their original levels. This accommodates the situations envisaged by Cappuccio and
Moretto (2001) and Lund (2005). It must be noticed that such situations do modify the ￿rm￿ s investment
policy and equity value.
In contrast, the magnitude of the economy-wide attitude towards risk and the exposure to systematic
risk can be changed in ways that leave the ￿rm￿ s investment policy and equity value una⁄ected. This
occurs whenever ￿ and ￿ are revised without altering their product ￿￿. Two polar cases of such an
observational equivalence are notable: the case of a risk-neutral economy (￿ = 0) and the case of a ￿rm￿ s
zero exposure to systematic risk (￿ = 0).
4 Numerical results
The ￿rst numerical issue we address is the direct e⁄ect on investment policy and on equity value of the
market price of systematic risk and of the ￿rm￿ s exposure to systematic risk. We adopt the base-case
4parameter levels reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Base case parameters
￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ r I
0% 2.5% 15% 0.5 0.5 7% 1
Figures 1A and 1B show how changes in the market price of risk impact the investment threshold
U and equity￿ s market value S (D). If the ￿rm is positively exposed to systematic risk (￿ = 0:5), an
increase in ￿ implies a downward revision of the risk-adjusted percentage drift ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ of the cash￿ ow
process. This lessens the risk-adjusted probability of hitting a given upper barrier, but it also implies
a de￿ ation of any security exposed to systematic risk, including a depression of the investment payo⁄
U
r+￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿ I. The second e⁄ect prevails so that investment is delayed to improve the cash￿ ow level U
at which it is optimally carried with the objective of maximizing the stock price. If the ￿rm￿ s cash￿ ows
exhibit no exposure to systematic risk (￿ = 0), alterations in the economy-wide attitude towards risk
have no impact on the ￿rm￿ s investment policy and on its stock price.
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threshold U
Figure 1A: U versus ￿ for ￿ = 0:5 (black) and for ￿ = 0 (red)









Figure 1B: S (D) versus D given ￿ = 0:5 for ￿ = 0 (green), ￿ = 0:5 (black), ￿ = 1 (red), and
￿ = 1:5 (magenta). The boxes represent the investment threshold U and equity￿ s corresponding
value S (U)
Figures 2A and 2B provide evidence on what is the e⁄ect on U and on S (D) of changes in the ￿rm￿ s
exposure to systematic risk. If systematic risk is disliked at the economy-wide level (￿ = 0:5), cash￿ ow￿ s
negative correlation ￿ with systematic shocks implies an upward revision of its risk-adjusted percentage
drift ￿￿￿￿￿, which raises the risk-adjusted probability of hitting a given upper barrier. A negative ￿ also
implies a value swelling of any claim on the ￿rm￿ s cash￿ ows, counting the investment payo⁄ U
r+￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿I.
Both e⁄ects go in the same direction of being conducive to an anticipated optimal investment as U can
be confortably lowered to maximize equity value. The opposite arguments hold for a positive ￿. If there
is economy-wide risk neutrality (￿ = 0), changes in ￿ have no impact on the ￿rm￿ s investment decision
and on its equity value.








Figure 2A: U versus ￿ for ￿ = 0:5 (black) and for ￿ = 0 (red), given r + ￿￿￿ > ￿0








Figure 2B: S (D) versus D given ￿ = 0:5 for ￿ = ￿0:5 (black), ￿ = ￿0:25 (red), and ￿ = 0
(green), and ￿ = 0:25 (magenta). The boxes represent the investment threshold U and equity￿ s
corresponding value S (U)
Changes in cash￿ ow volatility modify risk premia even if ￿ and ￿ are kept constant. Obviously, such
changes must be understood as modi￿cations of the systematic component of cash￿ ow volatility. The
second issue we address is how the market price of systematic risk and the ￿rm￿ s exposure to systematic
risk contribute to the e⁄ects of volatility on investment policy and on equity valuation. Figure 3A shows
how sensitive is optimal investment to increases in ￿. In the absence of any risk premium in the economy
(￿ = 0), a swelled volatility implies that any given upper barrier is lesser di¢ cult to be reached, while the
investment payo⁄ U
r+￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿ I remains una⁄ected. Hence, optimal investment is deferred to maximize
the stock price. Investment postponement is more prominent in the presence of economy-wide risk premia
7(￿ = 0:5) and of positive correlation between the ￿rm￿ s cash￿ ows with systematic risk (￿ = 0:5). A swelled
volatility downsizes the risk-adjusted percentage drift ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, but it also comes along with a de￿ ation
of any claim on the ￿rm￿ s cash￿ ows, including a devaluation of the investment payo⁄ U
r+￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿ I.
The second e⁄ect wins so that investment is even more postponed to pump up the cash￿ ow level U at
which the investment option is optimally exercised. Figure 3B shows that, in the two observationally
equivalent cases ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0, the value of the option of waiting to invest experiences a barely visible
increase as ￿ moves up, leaving the ￿rm￿ s stock price nearly una⁄ected. Hence, risk premia (￿ = 0:5)
and higher volatility of cash￿ ows will predictably dent the market value of a ￿rm with positive exposure
to systematic risk (￿ = 0:5). This is con￿rmed by Figure 3C.






Figure 3A: U versus ￿ for ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:5 (black) and for either ￿ = 0 or ￿ = 0 (red)







Figure 3C: S (D) versus D given either ￿ = 0 or ￿ = 0 for ￿ = 0:05 (black), ￿ = 0:10 (red),
￿ = 0:15 (green), and ￿ = 0:20 (magenta). The boxes represent the investment threshold U and
equity￿ s corresponding value S (U)









Figure 3B: S (D) versus D given ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:5 for ￿ = 0:05 (black), ￿ = 0:10 (red),
￿ = 0:15 (green), and ￿ = 0:20 (magenta). The boxes represent the investment threshold U and
equity￿ s corresponding value S (U)
5 Conclusions
Our work builds on the extant literature that gauges the impact of systematic risk on real options. We
consider an unlevered ￿rm that, upon incurring an irreversible cost, has the option of lifting the expected
growth rate of its existing cash￿ ows rather than the standard option of either scaling them up or buying
incremental assets. The investment policy and the stock value of the unlevered ￿rm are studied as a
function of economy-wide risk premia, of ￿rm￿ s exposure to systematic risk, and of cash￿ ow volatility.
Even in the presence of the investment option, a surge in the systematic component of cash￿ ow volatility
is shown to have a net de￿ ating e⁄ect on the ￿rm￿ s equity value.
An interesting avenue for future research is the examination, via an extension of the analysis in Mauer
and Ott (2000), of the impact of risk premia on the cost of Myers￿ s (1977) debt overhang problem for a
levered corporation endowed with growth options.
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